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by 
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Abstract 
 
We study how competitive pressure influences the make-or-buy decision that oligopolistic firms 
face between producing an intermediate component in-house or purchasing it from a domestic 
supplier. We model outsourcing as a bilateral relationship in which the supplier undertakes 
relationship-specific investments. A home and foreign firm compete in the home market.  
Firms’ mode of operation decision depends on cost and strategic considerations. Competitive 
pressure increases firms’ incentive to outsource. Consumer gains from trade liberalisation are 
enhanced when it leads to less outsourcing.   
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Non-Technical Summary  
There has been a rapid expansion in outsourcing in recent years, with firms outsourcing activities as 
diverse as final assembly, R&D and after-sales services. The possibility of outsourcing faces the firm with 
fundamental decisions with respect to its mode of operation.   The majority of the theoretical literature on 
the mode of operation decision by firms hinges on the conventional view that outsourcing is driven by cost 
considerations.  Cost considerations are of course important determinants of outsourcing.  However, the 
existing empirical evidence is by no means conclusive as to the contribution of outsourcing to cost savings 
and/or to improvements in the quality of intermediates and suggests that cost-saving may not offer an 
exhaustive explanation of the widespread use of outsourcing.  
In this paper we offer an explanation of this evidence by demonstrating that in concentrated industries 
strategic considerations may interact with cost considerations in determining the make-or-buy decision of 
firms.  Specifically, we argue that in oligopolistic industries firms may choose their mode of operation 
strategically to affect the behaviour of competitors.  
We develop a model of endogenous outsourcing in an international oligopoly setting where a final good 
producer enters a bilateral relationship with an upstream supplier which undertakes relationship-specific 
investments.   The fact that an enforceable contract cannot be written in advance of the relationship 
specific investment gives rise to a hold-up problem that leads to an underinvestment in quality since the 
supplier anticipates that it will not capture all of the marginal benefit of investment.  This may in turn result 
in a higher marginal production cost for the final producer. The main advantage of vertical integration for 
the final producer is that it avoids the underinvestment problem and its main disadvantage is the existence 
of a fixed corporate governance cost associated with managing a larger and more complex organisation.  
Outsourcing, instead, involves accepting higher marginal costs in exchange for a saving on fixed 
(governance) costs.   In a Cournot oligopoly setting, this gives rise to an additional strategic incentive to 
vertically integrate – as the lower marginal costs reduce the rival’s output and thus indirectly raises the 
integrated firm’s profits.   However, strategic outsourcing is also a possibility even when it results in higher 
marginal costs.  This is because when a firm chooses outsourcing, the rival firm’s incentive to invest 
strategically is reduced.  We show that when a firm has a sufficiently small market share under vertical 
integration, it has an incentive to strategically switch to outsourcing so as to increase its own and reduce 
its rival’s investment and output.  
We show that the choice of the mode of operation by firms depends the competitive pressure facing firms, 
the latter being directly affected by trade liberalisation.  In general, an increase in competitive pressure 
leads to a greater ‘demand’ for outsourcing and to a reduction in its ‘supply’. Thus our model suggests 
that we can expect outsourcing to be more likely when firms face intermediate levels of competitive 
pressure (and of trade costs).   
Unlike most contributions in the outsourcing literature (e.g. Grossman and Helpman, 2002), this model 
gives rise to the possibility of ‘mixed outcomes’ even with ex-ante symmetry between firms – consistent 
with existing stylised facts whereby not all firms in the same industry and in all countries adopt the same 
mode of operation strategy.   
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‘MAKE-OR-BUY’ IN INTERNATIONAL OLIGOPOLY AND  
THE ROLE OF COMPETITIVE PRESSURE  
 
1.  INTRODUCTION    
This paper aims to shed light on the organisational form of production in oligopolistic settings.  
We focus on how changes in the level of competitive pressure influence the make-or-buy 
decision that a firm faces between producing an intermediate component in-house (thus opting 
for vertical integration) or purchasing it from a domestic supplier (i.e. outsourcing it to an 
upstream firm).  We apply our analysis to a set up where trade liberalisation affects the mode of 
operation decision through its effects on the competitive pressure facing firms. 
 There has been a rapid expansion in outsourcing in recent years, with firms outsourcing 
activities as diverse as final assembly, R&D and after-sales services. The possibility of 
outsourcing faces the firm with fundamental decisions with respect to its mode of operation – 
whether to produce in house or to outsource and whether to outsource to domestic or to foreign 
suppliers.  The growing importance of outsourcing has resulted in the huge increase in interest 
that this phenomenon has received, both empirically and theoretically, in the academic literature.1   
 Although there is now a vast and diverse theoretical literature on outsourcing, the most 
influential strand of this dates back to Williamson (1975, 1985), and Grossman and Hart (1986) 
and is based on the role of incomplete contracts, asset specificity and transaction costs in guiding 
firms’ mode of operation decisions within choice theoretic frameworks that focus on the bilateral 
relationship between a single producer and a potential supplier.  More recently, a number of 
authors have suggested the need to contextualise this relationship within theoretical frameworks 
that allow for the interdependence between firms’ choice and market structure and/or general 
equilibrium effects. McLaren (2000), Grossman and Helpman (2002, 2003, and 2005), and 
Antràs and Helpman (2004) endogenise market structure in frameworks with matching and find 
that outsourcing is more attractive the ‘thicker’ is the market for suppliers. Entry of upstream 
firms, in turn, is more likely the ‘thicker’ the market for potential buyers. In most cases in these 
models, downstream firms must choose between vertical integration that may involve higher 
governance costs and entering an outsourcing relationship with an upstream firm that is beset 
with problems of contract incompleteness which typically arise because the supplier must make a 
                                                          
1   See for instance Abraham and Taylor (1996), Audet (1996), Feenstra (1998), Campa and Goldberg  (1997) , 
Hummels et al (2001), and Bartel et al (2005). 
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relationship specific investment (RSI) to customise the inputs for the downstream firms.  Even 
though the final producer can recognise after delivery if the input has the desired features, firms 
cannot sign an enforceable contract ex-ante that specifies all its characteristics2 – thus giving rise 
to a hold-up problem.  Some of these papers focus on domestic outsourcing while others consider 
international outsourcing and foreign direct investment.3  In all cases, the theoretical models 
developed in this strand of the literature are based on general equilibrium frameworks with 
monopolistically competitive market structures and they thus abstract from strategic interaction 
between firms.   
 The majority of the theoretical literature on the mode of operation decision by firms hinges 
on the conventional view that outsourcing is mainly driven by cost considerations.  In a sense, it 
could be argued that this also applies to the recent contributions by Antràs, Grossman and 
Helpman mentioned above, to the extent that ‘market thickness’ (by making matching more 
efficient) ultimately reduces costs.  Cost considerations are of course important determinants of 
outsourcing.4   However, the existing empirical evidence is by no means conclusive as to the 
contribution of outsourcing to cost savings and/or to improvements in the quality of 
intermediates.5  This evidence suggests that cost-savings may not offer an exhaustive explanation 
of the widespread use of outsourcing.  
 We contend in this paper that in concentrated industries (where firms have significant 
degrees of market power) strategic considerations may interact with cost considerations in 
determining the make-or-buy decision of firms.  Specifically, we argue that firms may choose 
their mode of operation strategically to affect the behaviour of competitors. Clearly, the 
exploration of this conjecture requires a departure from monopolistically competitive market 
structures to consider oligopolistic settings.    
                                                          
2   As in Hart and Moore (1990), this contract incompleteness originates from the inability of third parties to verify 
the suitability of the inputs provided by the suppliers.  See Spencer (2005) and Helpman (2006) for overviews. 
3   In Grossman and Helpman (2002) firms choose between domestic outsourcing and vertical integration, in 
Grossman and Helpman (2003) firms choose between foreign direct investment and foreign outsourcing.  Antràs 
and Helpman (2004) allow for all four possibilities – vertical integration at home or abroad and domestic and 
foreign outsourcing.  
4  For instance, a recent UK survey by Manpower found that the main motivation behind outsourcing of services is 
cost reduction (http://www.manpower.co.uk/news/OutsourcingSurvey.pdf)  
5  A recent survey by Software Development Magazine (2004) found that over half of the IT specialists interviewed 
reported that the quality of outsourced services was inferior to that produced in-house.  For example, using firm-
level panel data from the German cost structure survey over the period 1992-2000, Görzig and Stephan (2002) 
find that firms that outsourced service functions previously provided within the firm experienced a deterioration 
of return per employee. A negative relationship between outsourcing and firm level profitability is found for 
smaller firms by Görg and Hanley (2004) for the electronic industry in Ireland.  
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 The existence of a link between strategy and firms’ mode of operation is not entirely new.  
Within a Cournot setting, Nickerson and Vanden Bergh (1999) show that organisational choices 
are affected by strategic considerations in the firm-customer transactions.  Shy and Stenbacka 
(2003) show that competition in the upstream industry affects production efficiency and the 
choice in the mode of operation of a downstream differentiated Bertrand duopoly when vertical 
integration involves higher fixed costs but lower marginal costs.  Chen et al (2004) present a 
special case of outsourcing where an oligopolistic domestic firm may buy an intermediate from a 
more efficient firm that is also its competitor on the final goods market. This type of outsourcing, 
which facilitates collusion, differs substantially from the one we consider in this paper and 
highlights a different kind of strategic effect.   To our knowledge, however, in the existing 
oligopoly literature on outsourcing issues related to incomplete contracts and relationship specific 
investment are not taken into account and their role in determining the nature of the trade-offs 
facing firms when making their mode of operation decisions are therefore disregarded.6  
 We develop an oligopoly model in which downstream firms that outsource 7  enter a 
bilateral relationship with an upstream firm that must carry out a relationship specific investment.  
Rather than focusing on an incentive contract that tries to encourage investment – as in Grossman 
and Hart (1986) – we assume that if the final good firm chooses to outsource, then it and its 
intermediate input supplier bargain ex-post (after investment has been sunk) over the price of the 
intermediate.  The fact that an enforceable contract cannot be written in advance of the 
relationship specific investment then gives rise to a hold-up problem that in this model leads to an 
underinvestment in quality which may in turn result in a higher marginal production cost.  The 
literature on the organisation of production focuses on the effect of organisational costs on the 
choice of mode of operation.8  In our model the main advantage of vertical integration for the 
final producer is that it avoids the hold-up problem and its main disadvantage is the existence of a 
fixed corporate governance cost associated with managing a larger and more complex 
organisation.   
                                                          
6   Some contributions on the Japanese Keiretsu are more in line with the standard outsourcing literature. For 
instance, in Spencer and Qui (2001) downstream Cournot oligopolists buy from upstream keiretsu members in a 
context in which investment contracts cannot be written and upstream firms carry out relationship specific 
investments.  Their paper, however, does not endogenise the outsourcing decision.    
7    Following standard terminology, by outsourcing we mean the acquisition of an input or service from another 
firm. Bhagwati et al (2005) use the term in a much more restricted way to mean the acquisition of services from 
unaffiliated foreign firms. 
8    The separation of organisational costs into managerial and transactions costs goes back to Coase (1937). 
 4
 The basic model is introduced in Section 2 and the four-stage game between the home and 
foreign firm and the supplier of the intermediate is solved in Section 3. In Section 4, we examine 
the effects of trade liberalisation on the outcome of the game and on the welfare of consumers. 
Section 5 draws some conclusions and suggests some directions for future research.  
 
2.  THE MODEL  
There are two final good firms, one located in the home country and one located in a foreign 
country.  The firms produce a homogenous product and compete in the home market only.   
 Demand in the home market is given by: 
 )( *yyap +−= ,  (1)  
where p is the price of the good, a is a constant parameter, and y and *y are the quantities 
produced by the home and foreign firm respectively (henceforth, an asterisk will denote the 
foreign variables and parameters).  
 We assume that the production of the final good requires a specialised component, which is 
combined in fixed proportions with other inputs (such as labour).  One unit of the customised 
intermediate is required per unit of output.  We assume that both home and foreign firms can 
choose whether to become vertically integrated or to follow an outsourcing strategy, by 
purchasing the intermediate good from a domestic (i.e. located in their respective country) 
supplier.  
 Focusing on the home firm (the production setup for the firm is analogous), the 
intermediate input can either be produced in-house at a marginal cost of r or can be purchased 
from an upstream supplier at the price q.  We model the other factors used in production as a 
composite input and normalise its price at unity.  Let e be the number of units of this input 
required to produce a unit of output.  Thus e is the contribution of the other inputs to the marginal 
cost.  When a firm obtains an intermediate good, it must expend resources in order to adapt it to 
its particular needs.  The greater the extent to which the intermediate has already been customised 
to fit the needs of the final producer, the easier it will be for the final producer to use it and the 
less resources the final producer will have to expend in adapting the input.  Let 0>−= kee  be 
the per-unit input requirement for the composite input, where e  is a constant and k captures the 
‘usefulness’ of the intermediate: a better intermediate is one that requires to be combined with 
fewer other inputs in order to produce a unit of output. Hence, the better the quality and 
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customisation of the intermediate good, the cheaper (or more efficient) are the other inputs used 
in production.9  The ‘usefulness’ of the intermediate to the final producer depends on the level of 
investment in its quality and customisation to the final good production. We will assume that 
Kk = , where K is investment in quality and customisation.  Using the subscripts V and O to 
denote vertical integration and outsourcing respectively, marginal production cost for the 
domestic firm will thus be:  
 keqcO −+=  (2a)  
if the firm outsources its intermediate, and  
 kercV −+= .  (2b) 
if it produces it in-house.   
 If the home firm is vertically integrated, its profit function is given by:  
 Gkycp VV −−−=
2)(π , (3a) 
where Kk =2  is the investment cost incurred with respect to the intermediate and G represents 
the fixed governance cost that a vertically integrated firm is assumed to incur.  In line with the 
literature on vertical integration, we assume that governance costs are higher for a vertically 
integrated firm than for a firm that outsources; without loss of generality, we shall then set the 
governance cost for the latter to zero.  If the firm chooses to outsource, its profit function will 
therefore be: 
 ycp OO )( −=π . (3b)  
Similarly, the profit functions for the foreign firm in the two regimes are respectively given by: 
 *2**** )( Gkytcp VV −−−−=π , (4a)  
and  
 *** )( ytcp OO −−=π , (4b)  
where foreign marginal costs *Vc   and 
*
Oc  in equations (4a) and (4b) are analogous to the 
corresponding home firm ones, and t is the transport cost incurred by the foreign firm in serving 
the home market. 
 Note that by outsourcing, a firm avoids both the governance cost as well as the investment 
cost on the intermediate. The latter, is now borne by the upstream supplier.  In the home country, 
                                                          
9  For instance the better intermediate may allow the firm to economise on assembly costs. For a similar approach 
see  Spencer and Qui (2001).  
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the supplier will earn revenue ( )mq r m− , where m is output of intermediates and mr  is the 
intermediate producer’s marginal production cost.10 Since one unit of the intermediate is needed 
in the production of each unit of final output, we can write m y= . This firm must pay a fixed 
entry cost F, and has profit: 
 Fkyrq m −−−=
2)(μ . (5) 
Similarly, the profit of the intermediate firm in the foreign country will be given by: 
  *2***** )( Fkyrq m −−−=μ . (6) 
 We now turn to the discussion of the game.  
 
3.  THE GAME   
The model is a four stage game.  In stage one, firms decide whether to outsource their 
intermediate or to produce it in-house.  If they decide to outsource, they approach a specialised 
supplier firm, located in their respective domestic market, which will produce the intermediate.11  
In stage two, the firms invest in the development of the intermediate.  If the downstream firms 
opt for outsourcing, then it is the specialised supplier firms that undertake this investment.  In 
stage three, the firms (if they out-source) bargain with the intermediate supplier over the price of 
the intermediate.  We assume that the final good producer only has enough time to negotiate with 
a single supplier.  As in Grossman and Helpman (2003), should bargaining breakdown, the 
producer will not have sufficient time to produce the intermediate itself, and so will exit the 
market – while the supplier will have wasted its investment.  In stage four, the intermediate is 
supplied and the final output is produced.12 
 In the final stage of the game the two firms engage in Cournot competition with outputs 
determined by the first-order conditions, respectively given by: 
 0=−−= ycpyπ  (7) 
                                                          
10  We assume that the marginal production cost of the intermediate can differ depending on whether it is produced 
in-house or by the upstream firm, thus mr  is not necessarily equal to r.   
11  One could think of there being ex-ante many identical potential intermediate suppliers.  However, given that there 
is only one downstream firm, only one firm will enter in equilibrium since with more than one upstream firm, as 
a result of Bertrand competition between firms, the intermediate price would be driven to the marginal production 
cost and the firms will be unable to cover their investment and fixed entry costs – with more firms, the effective 
bargaining power of each intermediate producer would drop to zero (i.e., the downstream producer would induce 
mutual undercutting by the upstream firms to drive the price of the intermediate to marginal cost. 
12  This set up corresponds to the ‘informal arrangement’ described by McLaren (1999), who argues that trade 
liberalisation works towards less formality in contracting, making informal arrangements more likely.  
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and: 
 0**** =−−−= tycpyπ ,              (8) 
where c and *c  will vary depending on the mode of operation chosen by the firms.  The resulting 
equilibrium output for the home and foreign firm respectively will then be: 
 
3
2 * tccay ++−= ,                      (9) 
and: 
 
3
)(2 ** ctcay ++−= .                      (10) 
 There are four regimes: (V,V),  (V,O), (O,V), and (O,O), where the first letter refers to the 
home country and the second refers to the foreign country.  Given the number of possible 
outcomes, and the corresponding binary choices of the firms, a detailed discussion of each 
individual regime would be very tedious and yield few additional insights.  Instead, we shall look 
in detail at a situation in which, given the vertical integration of one of the firms, the other firm 
chooses its mode of operation.  Once the nature of the strategic effects that are at play is 
understood, we shall then briefly discuss the other cases.  Therefore, let us first consider the case 
in which the home firm vertically integrates and focus on the choice facing the foreign firm 
between vertical integration and outsourcing.  We will then briefly discuss the outsourcing 
decision of the foreign firm when the home firm outsources as well as the outsourcing decisions 
of the home firm.   
 
3.1. The home firm is vertically integrated   
When the home firm is vertically integrated, we need to distinguish between the subgame in 
which the foreign firm also vertically integrates and the one in which it outsources.  We shall 
discuss these two cases in the two next subsections respectively.  Stage three of the game will 
only exist if the foreign firm chooses to outsource production of its intermediate input.   In stage 
two, firms choose their level of investment in the intermediate good.   
 
3.1.1.   The foreign firm vertically integrates when the home firm is vertically integrated 
We first consider the subgame in which the foreign firm produces the intermediate in-house.  In 
choosing its optimal investment level, in stage two of the game each firm takes account of both 
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the direct cost-reducing effect of investment on its own profit and also the strategic effect on its 
rival’s output in the final stage.  Thus, the home firm’s first-order condition is:   
 0
*
* =+= dk
dy
dk
d
yk ππ
π ,  (11) 
where the first term on the right-hand side, kykyckk 22 −=−−=π , is the direct effect of k on 
own profits.  As regards the second term, ypyy −=′=*π , it can be shown from (10) that 
3/13//* −== kcdkdy .  (Thus, the strategic effect )/(
*
* dkdyyπ  is positive and hence 
encourages the firm to invest more in the development of the intermediate good.)  The first-order 
condition can then be rewritten as: 
 yk )3/2(= . (12) 
Similarly, the foreign firm’s first-order condition for investment when it produces the 
intermediate in-house is: 
 0*
**
*
*
* =+=
dk
dy
dk
d
yk ππ
π  (13) 
which implies:  
 ** )3/2( yk = . (14) 
 
3.1.2.   The foreign firm outsources when the home firm is vertically integrated 
We now consider the subgame in which the foreign firm outsources its intermediate.   In stage 
three, it bargains with its supplier firm over the price of the intermediate.13  Recall that all fixed 
and investment costs are sunk at this stage.  The price *q  of the intermediate good results from 
the maximisation of the following Nash bargain: 
 [ ] [ ] ** 1****** )()( ββ −−−−= yrqytcpN mO , (15) 
where *β  and ( *1 β− ) represent the bargaining power of the foreign downstream and upstream 
firms respectively.  Taking the first–order condition of *N  with respect to *q  and rearranging, we 
obtain: 
                                                          
13  The purchase of intermediate components is sometimes assumed to involve the combination of a fixed lump-sum 
payment and a price set at marginal cost.  As highlighted by Spencer (2005), however, the transfer of rents 
through lump-sum payments is at odds with stylised facts about domestic and international transactions.  Our 
paper recognizes that outsourcing contracts typically involve strictly positive prices that exceed marginal costs. 
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 **
*
**
1
1
2
3 yrq m ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
+
−
+= β
β . (16) 
The equilibrium intermediate mark-up, * *mq r− , falls in the foreign firm’s bargaining power, but 
increases in its output *y .  The rent-extracting ability of the intermediate firm will be higher, 
ceteris paribus, the weaker is the bargaining position of the foreign final good producer and the 
larger is the latter’s output.  Although q* must be larger than *mr , it needs not be higher than 
*r .  
Note, however, that even if *q  is lower than *r , it may still be the case that the marginal 
production cost of the vertically integrated firm is lower than that of a downstream firm that 
chooses to outsource: as we shall see, in fact, the level of investment may be lower under 
outsourcing.  
 Next, we will consider how the first-order conditions for investment are modified by the 
decision of the foreign firm to outsource.  When the foreign firm chooses outsourcing, investment 
in k* is undertaken by the intermediate firm.  
 We begin with the investment decision of the home firm.  An increase in k will not now 
have as large a negative effect on the foreign firm’s output as when the latter is vertically 
integrated.  The reason for this is that an increase in k results in a lower q * , thus helping to 
partially offset the negative impact on *y .  Thus, even though the home firm’s first-order 
condition takes the same form as in (11), the derivative dkdy /*  is different, as k now also affects 
*y  through changes in *q .  Hence, the strategic incentive for home investment is lessened as a 
result of the endogenous change in the price of the intermediate because 
)/)(3/2()3/(/ ** dkdccdkdy Ok −=  with
* * * * */ / (3 / 2)[(1 ) /(1 )] /Odc dk dq dk dy dkβ β= = − + . 
Rearranging, we get: 0)1)(6/1(/ ** <+−= βdkdy , the absolute value of which is less than that 
in the vertical integration case (–1/3) except when 1* =β , that is when the foreign firm has 
maximum bargaining power in its negotiations with the supplier  firm.  Thus, the first-order 
condition can be rewritten as:    
 yk
12
)7( *β+
= .  (17) 
                                                                                                                                                                                            
The distribution of rents between intermediate supplier and final good producer (and hence the return for 
relationship-specific investment) is determined through Nash bargaining over the price after investment is sunk. 
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A comparison of the investment-to-output ratios in (12) and (17) reveals that the home firm’s 
equilibrium investment-to-output ratio is lower when its rival outsources its intermediate than 
when it produces it in-house (except when 1* =β ).  Effectively, outsourcing by the foreign firm 
‘softens’ the behaviour of its rival, inducing it to invest less per unit of output. As will become 
clearer later, this behaviour gives rise to a strategic motive for outsourcing.   
 In the foreign country, the supplier firm now undertakes the investment in the intermediate 
good.  This firm chooses k *  to maximise (6).  The intermediate firm only receives a share 
(determined by its bargaining power) of the rent generated by the investment; as a result, the firm 
does not fully appropriate the marginal benefit of its investment and this reduces the incentive to 
invest.  In addition, note that the upstream foreign firm does not directly strategically interact 
with the home firm (this is evident from the profit function ),( *** kyμ  which does not depend 
directly on y) – unlike the vertically integrated foreign firm which, as we saw earlier, does invest 
strategically. This also works to reduce the marginal benefit of investment.    
 We can use (16) in (6) to obtain:   
 *2*2**
*
*
)1(
)1(
2
3 Fky −−
+
−
= β
βμ . (18) 
The first order condition for the profit maximising choice of k *  is then: 
 02
)1(
)1(3 **
*
*
*
*
*
*
=−
+
−
= k
dk
dyy
dk
d
β
βμ . (19) 
It is straightforward to show that 03/)1(/ *** >+= βdkdy  and so the first-order condition can 
be written as: 
 *
*
*
2
)1( yk β−= . (20) 
Note that as β *  rises, the producer invests less per unit of output as its share of the rents that are 
generated falls.  In the limit, when the upstream firm has no bargaining power (i.e. *β =1), it will 
have no incentive to make any relationship-specific investment.  This implies that the foreign 
equilibrium investment-to-output ratio is lower when a firm outsources its intermediate than 
when it produces it in-house.14   
                                                          
14  Another reason why the marginal benefit of investment for the intermediate firm tends to be lower than in an 
integrated firm is that output is below the rent maximising level, due to double marginalisation. Double 
marginalisation could be avoided by efficient bargaining or if the firms agreed on a two part tariff. This, however, 
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 An important implication of this is that investment is very likely to be lower under 
outsourcing, unless there is a strong underlying cost advantage associated with it (i.e. unless  
* * *
mr rρ = −  is very large). Because of an underinvestment associated with outsourcing, it is easy 
to construct cases where outsourcing does not lead to lower marginal costs even when the price 
of the intermediate is lower than the marginal cost of producing it in-house (i.e. * *q r< ). A lower 
level of investment under outsourcing translates into a low degree of customisation and quality 
which can offset the lower price of the outsourced intermediate good. As a result, a modest value 
of *ρ  (even one that gives rise to * *q r< ) is not always enough to ensure that marginal costs are 
lower under outsourcing than under vertical integration.  This result is of importance because it 
provides theoretical underpinnings for those empirical findings that suggest that outsourcing may 
be associated with a decrease in the quality of the intermediate. 15   
 
3.1.3.   The choice of the foreign firm’s mode of operation 
To establish whether the foreign firm will outsource or choose to be vertically integrated we must 
compare its profits under the two regimes.  However, since the ultimate aim of our analysis is to 
determine how the choice of the mode of operation can be used strategically by firms to affect the 
oligopoly game between them, it proves useful to first examine how the make-or-buy decision 
affects investment levels, equilibrium market shares and output levels.  A natural approach to this 
question is to consider the effect of the mode of operation on the firms’ output reaction functions.  
Nevertheless, these do not take account of the indirect effect of the foreign firm’s outsourcing on 
output through changes in the level of investment and the price of the intermediate good.  For 
instance, the foreign reaction function that is obtained from the output first-order condition in (8) 
can be written as );( *** tcyy +=ψ , but the effect of outsourcing is on the c *  via changes in k *  
and q * .  However, by making appropriate substitutions we can eliminate k *  and q *  (and k in the 
case of the home firm).  Let us call the resulting functions output response functions16.  In the 
absence of outsourcing, the output response functions for the home and foreign firms 
respectively, are: 
                                                                                                                                                                                            
would not overcome the fact that the share going to the investing firm is lower than unity due to its limited 
bargaining power.  Hence, the main intuition of our model would qualitatively go through, but we feel it is more 
interesting and realistic to stick to our assumption.  
15  See footnote 6. 
16    These are effectively reduced form reaction functions.   
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 ][
4
3 *
VVVV yAy −= , (21a) 
where )( reaA −−= , and  
 ][
4
3*
VVVV yAy −−= Φ , (21b) 
where * *( ) ( )t e r e rΦ = + + − +  can be thought of as the underlying (‘pre-investment’) marginal 
cost disadvantage of the foreign firm; this disadvantage will be larger the higher the transport cost 
and the greater the difference between )( ** re +  and )( re +  which can reflect international 
relative factor price and productivity differences.  An increase in Φ will then capture an increase 
in the relative competitive pressure faced by the foreign firm.  When the foreign firm chooses to 
outsource, the corresponding output response functions are: 
 ][
)17(
12 *
* VOVO yAy −
−
= β  (22a) 
and 
   ][
)1()7(
)1(2 *
2**
*
*
VOVO yAy −+−
−−+
+
= ρΦββ
β , (22b) 
where *ρ  captures the difference between the marginal costs of producing the intermediate 
incurred by the downstream firm (when it is vertically integrated) and by the upstream 
intermediate producer.   
 These functions are illustrated in Figure 1.  In the figure we assume ex ante symmetry 
between the firms, so that Φ  is zero but we consider two cases: one where 0* =ρ  and one where 
0* >ρ .   The curves labelled hR  and fR  are the home and foreign output response functions 
when both firms are vertically integrated. The equilibrium is at point E.  The curve labelled 'hR  is 
the output response function of the home firm when the foreign firm outsources the intermediate; 
the curve labelled 'fR  is the output response function of the foreign firm when it outsources and 
0* =ρ .  In this case, the corresponding equilibrium is at point 'E .  Inspection of equations (21) 
and (22) reveals that, at 0* =ρ , a switch to outsourcing by the foreign firm does not affect the 
zero-output intercept of these curves (which depend only on the terms in square brackets) and 
 13
merely results in a pivoting inward of the curves about the zero-output point.17  The home firm’s 
output response function pivots inwards because its investment-output ratio is lower when its 
rival outsources.  The reason the foreign output response pivots inwards is twofold.  First, the 
firm now faces a higher marginal cost of the intermediate as the upstream firm captures some 
rents. Second, the investment to output ratio is now lower as explained earlier.  At the new 
equilibrium 'E  total production is lower.  If 0* >ρ ,  then the foreign output response function, 
in addition to pivoting inward, also shifts outwards in a parallel manner.  A comparison of (21) 
and (22) reveals that whilst a foreign firm switching to outsourcing does not affect the home 
firm’s term in square bracket, it will affect that of the foreign firm if * 0ρ >   – i.e. when the 
marginal cost of producing the intermediate is lower under outsourcing than under vertical 
integration.  Note that outsourcing can raise foreign output at the expense of the home firm (as 
illustrated in Figure 1).  For this to happen, however, *ρ  needs to be positive and very large, i.e. 
the upstream producer of the intermediate needs to have a significant marginal cost advantage 
over the foreign downstream firm.  
Figure 1 about here 
 When 0Φ ≠ , the effect of outsourcing on firms’ market shares will depend on the extent of 
the relative cost disadvantage between the two firms.   For instance, at ρ * =0 and when the 
underlying competitive difference between firms is low, that is when Φ is small (as in Figure 1), 
outsourcing by the foreign firm lowers its market share and raises the market share of the home 
firm.  This does not imply that outsourcing necessarily reduces foreign profits.  It must be 
remembered that outsourcing also saves on governance costs and raises the market price.  When 
Φ is large enough, i.e. when the foreign firm is sufficiently uncompetitive, the market share 
shifting effect of outsourcing is reversed.  We show this in Figure 2 in which ρ * =0 and Φ is 
large.  Compared to Figure 1, the foreign output response functions have moved inward.  
Inspection of (21) and (22) reveals that the home output response curves are independent of Φ, 
whilst an increase in Φ shifts the foreign firm’s output response functions inwards in a parallel 
manner.    
                                                          
17  The home firm’s output response function would remain unchanged in the limiting case of 1* =β , when  ** mrq =  
and 0* =k .  
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 In Figure 2, outsourcing by the foreign firm increases its own market share at the expenses 
of the home firm.  With ρ * =0, the change in regime between outsourcing and vertical integration 
causes the output response curves to pivot around the firms’ zero output points.  Thus, the effect 
of outsourcing on an output response curve is greater the further we are away from the firm’s 
zero output point. When Φ is high, the foreign firm’s relative market share is small and the 
negative impact of outsourcing on the foreign output response curve is locally very small, while 
the negative effect on the corresponding home curve is locally much larger.  The net result is that 
home output falls and foreign output rises.  Note that the seemingly paradoxical result that 
**
VVVO yy > , when Φ is very large despite an inward shift of the output response curve, is due to 
strategic interaction between firms under oligopoly and would not occur under monopoly.  The 
firm’s decision to outsource can raise its own market share when the effect on the strategic 
aggressiveness of its rival is very strong.  This is more likely to be the case the larger the rival’s 
market share in the initial equilibrium, because the bigger and more powerful is one’s competitor, 
the larger the gain from reducing its aggressiveness. 18   Because of this strategic effect, 
outsourcing can sometime be optimal even when it is unambiguously cost increasing.19   
Figure 2 about here 
The above analysis can be summarised by the following proposition: 
Proposition 1: (i) Outsourcing by the foreign firm can never result in an increase in the output of 
both firms; (ii) At Φ=ρ * =0, the foreign firm’s output always falls if it outsources; (iii) at 
Φ=0, there always exists a ρ *  large enough that, following outsourcing, the foreign firm’s 
output rises at the expense of the home firm’s one; (iv) at ρ * =0, there exists a Φ large 
enough such that outsourcing increases the foreign firm’s output at the expense of the 
home firm’s.  
Proof: see Appendix A.  
 Equipped with this analysis, we can now proceed to compare the profits of the foreign firm 
under outsourcing and under vertical integration (given home vertical integration).  To this end, it 
is useful to obtain an expression for profits in terms of outputs and parameters only. 
                                                           
18   In this analysis we have, for simplicity, focused on the case of Φ>0.  If Φ<0, the home firm is small and the 
returns to the foreign firm from reducing its aggressiveness by outsourcing is consequently reduced. Hence, at 
* 0ρ =  and Φ<0, outsourcing could never increase the foreign firm’s output. Therefore, Φ<0 is qualitatively a 
special case of Φ small.  
19   In the case shown in Figure 2, even when * * 0G ρ= = , outsourcing increases the profit of the foreign firm. 
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 The output first order condition in (8) and the profit function under outsourcing in (4b) 
yield:   
 2** )( VOVO y=π .               (23) 
The corresponding expression under vertical integration is obtained by using the first-order 
conditions for output and for investment, given by (8) and (14) respectively, in (4a) to get 
   *2** )(
9
5 GyVVVV −=π . (24) 
It is immediately obvious from equations (23) and (24), that a sufficient condition for outsourcing 
to yield higher profits is ** VVVO yy ≥ .    
 The key parameters that affect the profit comparison are β * , G * , ρ *  and Φ. An increase 
in *ρ , by making the outsourcing technology more efficient, clearly works against vertical 
integration.  The effect of *β  on the outsourcing profits is small and ambiguous.20  The effect of 
a higher G *  is clearly to reduce *VVπ  and so make outsourcing more attractive.  Finally, turning to 
the effect of the relative cost competitiveness Φ on the relative attractiveness of outsourcing, it is 
clear that an increase in Φ will reduce both *VOπ  and *VVπ . However, its effect on *VVπ  is greater 
than its effect on *VOπ .
21  This is because, when the foreign firm outsources, the negative effect of 
a higher Φ is partially offset by a fall in q * .   
 A comparison of the profits of the foreign firm under the two regimes enables us to 
determine whether a threshold level of Φ exists that will induce a switch in the firm’s preferred 
mode of operation.   
 Figure 3 plots the foreign firm’s indifference profit locus, in Φ and G *  space at 0* =ρ , i.e. 
the figure shows the combinations of (Φ and G * ) at which ** VVVO ππ =  (for given values of β *  and 
the other parameters). 22   For any given level of Φ, the indifference profit locus gives the critical 
                                                          
20  On the one hand, a higher *β  raises the profit share of the downstream firm directly. On the other hand, it further 
increases the upstream firm’s underinvestment in the quality and the customisation of the intermediate input. This 
second effect works to lower downstream profits. 
21    This situation will be reversed for sufficiently large values of *ρ  and/or Φ, i.e. well above the level at which 
there is a trade-off between outsourcing and vertical integration. This region is not very interesting, however, 
because outsourcing is then trivially dominant.  
22  The figure is drawn for 2/1* =β . However, it can be shown that even large changes in *β  make no qualitative 
difference. 
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level of governance costs above which the foreign firm will chose to outsource.   In the region 
above (below) the curve, for any given level of Φ, governance costs are high (low) and the 
foreign firms chooses outsourcing (vertical integration). 23   
Figure 3 about here 
 As is clear from the figure, the critical value of G *  falls in Φ  indicating that from the final 
goods producer’s perspective an increase in competitive pressure works in favour of outsourcing. 
The explanation for the negative slope of this locus is that the profits under outsourcing fall less 
quickly in Φ than the profit under vertical integration. The reason for this is twofold.  Firstly, an 
increase in Φ strengthens the foreign firm’s strategic incentive to outsource in order to reduce the 
aggressiveness of the home firm.  Secondly, an increase in Φ also reduces the strategic incentives 
to vertically integrate.  To sees this, consider that when the firm chooses vertical integration, it 
trades off a higher fixed cost for higher operating profits.24  The relative gain from vertical 
integration depends on this improvement in operating profits achieved in exchange for the higher 
fixed governance costs.  However, the difference in operating profits between the two modes of 
operation narrows in Φ, as under outsourcing the fall in *q  works to cushion the fall in operating 
profits – while no such effect occurs under vertical integration.   
 At approximately Φ/A=0.22, the indifference locus falls below zero: hence, outsourcing is 
always preferred when, due to high competitive pressure, the firm’s market share is small.  This 
is not surprising given that, as we saw above, a sufficient condition for ** VVVO ππ >  is that 
**
VVVO yy ≥  (it has been stated in Proposition 1.(iv) and shown in Figure 2 that a large enough 
value of Φ exists such that the latter inequality holds).  When the locus falls below the axis, the 
firm will choose to outsource even when G * =0 (and ρ * =0).  In this region, * * *mq r r> = .  Thus, 
outsourcing is optimal in this region even though it is unambiguously cost increasing.  This 
region corresponds to the case shown in Figure 2, in which the pure strategic motive for 
outsourcing dominates. The result that outsourcing is more likely when the firm faces a high 
competitive pressure is consistent with empirical evidence that points to the fact that the use of 
subcontractors is more common amongst smaller and less profitable firms – e.g. Kimura (2002).   
                                                           
23  Of course, at some parameters values there is no trade-off between outsourcing and vertical integration but, by its 
very nature, there must be such a trade-off on an indifference locus. 
24  Note that along the locus, because there is a fixed governance cost of vertical integration, the marginal cost under 
vertical integration must be lower than under outsourcing for the profits to be equal in the two regimes.  
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 It is interesting at this stage to point out that, since outsourcing is a bilateral relationship, 
even if the final good producer wishes to outsource, an outsourcing firm may not find a firm 
willing to supply it with the intermediate input.  In fact, moving to consider the ‘supply’ of 
outsourcing, an increase in Φ reduces ceteris paribus the profits of the supplier firm μ * .  To see 
this, use the first-order condition for investment under outsourcing in (20) to substitute out k *  in 
(18) to yield: 
  **
2**
2**
)1(2
)1(6
2
)1()( Fy −⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
+
−−−
= β
ββμ . (25) 
From (25), we can see that *μ  is increasing in *y  and thus is falling in Φ  – i.e., an increase in 
competitive pressure may prevent the provision of an outsourcing service since, given F * >0, 
there is a threshold level of Φ above which outsourcing is impossible as the supplier will not find 
it profitable to enter.  Thus, at a high level of Φ the foreign firm would be forced back to vertical 
integration – and this level of Φ is lower the higher is F * .    
 These results suggest that it is in the intermediate range level of competitive pressure that 
outsourcing is most likely.   
 
3.2.  Both Firms Choose the Mode of Operation  
Having examined in detail the foreign firm’s choice of mode of operation, when the home firm is 
vertically integrated, we will now briefly consider the remaining cases.  
 The home firm’s choice between outsourcing and vertical integration when its rival is 
vertically integrated is essentially the same as that of the foreign firm discussed above.  With the 
foreign firm vertically integrated, the home firm’s indifference locus is the curve OVVV ππ = .   
However, note that an increase in Φ improves the competitive position of the home firm and thus 
works to improve its relative return to vertical integration.  Hence, this curve slopes upwards in 
(Φ, G) space (see Figure 4).  As discussed above for the case of the foreign firm, the choice of 
vertical integration involves trading off high fixed costs for low marginal costs.  As the home 
firm’s relative cost competitiveness rises, the relative disadvantage of incurring the governance 
cost falls and hence the relative return from expanding production via the vertical integration 
option rises.  Indeed, the choice of vertical integration is strategically more aggressive, because it 
involves lower marginal costs and hence higher output in exchange for higher governance costs.  
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A fall in Φ, by increasing the competitive pressure on the home firm, would increases the relative 
attractiveness of outsourcing even though by outsourcing the firm further reduces its output.  
Figure 4 about here 
 The figure also shows the OOVO ππ =  and 
**
OOOV ππ =  loci.  Once again, an increase in the 
firms’ competitiveness raises the relative return from vertical integration.  Thus, as with the other 
loci, the home (foreign) locus slopes up (down) in Φ.  As for the intercepts of these curves, it can 
be seen that at Φ=0 (i.e. when the firms are ex-ante symmetric), the relative incentive to 
vertically integrate is higher when the rival firm chooses to outsource. The explanation for this is 
essentially the same as the explanation for the fact that an increase in relative competitiveness 
raises the relative incentive to vertically integrate.  Ceteris paribus a firm’s incentive to be 
vertically integrated tends to be higher when its rival outsources, because outsourcing by a rival 
softens the competitive pressure a firm faces.  However, when the foreign firm vertically 
integrates, the competitive advantage of the home firm as Φ increases rises more quickly than 
when its rival outsources. This translates into a steeper indifference locus for the home firm when 
the foreign firm vertically integrates.  In other words, with foreign outsourcing, the home firm’s 
incentive to vertically integrate is rising faster in Φ, because the increase in Φ is partly offset by a 
fall in q*.  This explains why, in the diagram, the intercept of the OOVO ππ =  and 
**
OOOV ππ =  loci 
are above those of the  OVVV ππ =  and
**
VOVV ππ =  loci and yet the two home loci cross at higher 
values of Φ. 
 These four loci can be used to demarcate the equilibrium regime areas. Above all the loci 
in Figure 4, outsourcing is the dominant strategy for both firms, so (O,O) is the unique 
equilibrium.  Although not in a region in which both firms have a dominant strategy, (O,O) is 
also the unique equilibrium in the area trapped between the two home firm’s loci and to the right 
of their intersection.  This is because this area lies above both of the foreign firm’s loci, where the 
foreign firm’s dominant strategy is outsourcing; hence, the only relevant locus for the home firm 
is OOVO ππ = . Since this region lies above that locus, outsourcing is the best response for the 
home firm to foreign outsourcing and hence (O,O) must be the unique equilibrium. Outsourcing 
by both firms occurs only in the area above this locus.  Below all the loci, vertical integration is 
the dominant strategy for both firms, hence (V,V) is the unique equilibrium in that region. (V,O) 
is an equilibrium everywhere in the region enclosed by the OOVO ππ =  and 
**
VOVV ππ =  loci.  In 
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this region, the optimal strategy for the home firm is to vertically integrate, given that the foreign 
firm outsources, and the best reply for the latter is to outsource, given that the home firm 
vertically integrates. In the area bordered by the loci ** OOOV ππ =  and OVVV ππ = , (O,V) is also an 
equilibrium – together with (V,O). In this region, outsourcing is the best response for the home 
firm to foreign vertical integration, and vertical integration is the best response for the foreign 
firm to home outsourcing – at the same time, home vertical integration is the best response to 
foreign outsourcing and foreign outsourcing is the best response to home vertical integration. 
Hence, this is a region of multiple equilibria.  These equilibrium regimes are represented in 
Figure 5.  
Figure 5 about here 
 Hence, as can be seen from the figure, asymmetric equilibria are possible in this model, 
unlike the monopolistically competitive models such as those of Grossman, Helpman and Antràs.  
This is an important result, because it is consistent with the stylised fact that firms within the 
same industry often adopt different mode of operation strategies. Asymmetric equilibria are more 
likely the more asymmetric the underlying marginal cost structures of the firms (i.e. the larger is 
Φ in absolute value). This can be seen in the figure, where (V,O) becomes more likely the larger 
is Φ (and the foreign firm has a strong competitive disadvantage).  However even when Φ=0, that 
is with full ex-ante symmetry between firms, there is an intermediate range of G where 
asymmetric equilibria occur.  
 Differences in Φ can be driven by two things: differences in transport costs or differences 
in underlying marginal costs (which may in turn be due to international differences in factor 
prices, in particular labour costs). If there are underlying differences in factor cots, then these 
may also give rise to differences in the level of the fixed governance cost.  Hence, if foreign 
factor prices are higher, we may then expect G * >G.  Let G * =γG with γ>1.  Then, it is easy to 
show that in the (Φ, G) space, an increase in γ shifts the foreign loci downward proportionally – 
hence resulting in less foreign and more home vertical integration.  
 
4.  TRADE LIBERALISATION 
In this section we briefly bring out the implications of our analysis for the effects of trade 
liberalisation, modelled as a fall in the level of trade costs t, on firms’ optimal mode of operation.  
We shall also briefly explore its implications for the consumer.    
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 As we saw in the previous section, a fall in trade costs will change the level of Φ.   This 
will have implications for output, prices and investment under a give regime, but under some 
circumstances it will also lead to a regime shift.   We shall begin by examining the effects of 
trade liberalisation within a given regime and then consider its effects on regime outcomes.    
 Under a given regime, a fall in t improves the relative competitive position of the foreign 
firm at the expense of the home firm and this will result in a market share reallocation in favour 
of the former.  Under outsourcing, this market share reallocation results in an increase in the 
negotiated price of the intermediate in the foreign country, provided that the supplier firm has 
some bargaining power. Trade liberalisation will have the opposite effect in the home country, 
where it will lead to a fall in the negotiated price of the intermediate good. This is because trade 
liberalisation increases (decreases) the available rents in the foreign (home) country. As a result 
of trade liberalisation, the decline in the output of the home firm is proportionally smaller, due to 
the asymmetric effects of trade costs on the firms. Hence, the final good’s price must fall, as t 
falls.  These results are summarised in the following proposition: 
Proposition 2: For a given regime, trade liberalisation leads to (i) under both outsourcing or in-
house production, an increase (fall) in foreign (home) output and investment, and a fall in 
the market price; (ii) under outsourcing, an increase (decrease) in the price of the 
intermediate good in the foreign (home) country. 
Proof: see Appendix B. 
 Trade liberalisation can also lead to regime shifts as it can affect firms’ decision about their 
mode of operation. As we saw in the previous section, a fall in t (i.e. in Φ) will increase the 
incentive of the foreign firm and decrease the incentive of the home firm to choose vertical 
integration.25  
 In Figure 6, which is similar to Figure 5 but has trade costs on the horizontal axis and 
G=G *  on the vertical axis, at free-trade the foreign firm has an underlying cost advantage.  In 
notational terms, Φ<0 at t=0.26   
Figure 6 about here 
                                                           
25  Under outsourcing, trade liberalisation increases the profit of the intermediate supplier in the foreign country and 
reduces the profit of the intermediate supplier in the home country. Clearly, excessive competitive pressure can 
prevent outsourcing from being supplied, as discussed at the end of Section 3.1.3.  
26  Giving the foreign firm a cost advantage at free-trade allows us to present cases in which Φ is positive and cases 
in which it is negative on the same diagram. At high values of t (Φ>0) the home firm has a cost advantage, while 
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As can be seen from Figure 6, at sufficiently low levels of governance costs, and Φ>0, a fall in t 
will eventually lead to switch from the (V,O) to the (V,V) regime (as the home firm stays 
vertically integrated and the foreign firm is induced to change regime). At negative values of Φ, 
further trade liberalisation can result in a switch from (V,V) to (O,V).  At sufficiently high levels 
of governance costs, and Φ>0, trade liberalisation leads to a move from (V,O) to (O,O), as the 
home firm is induced to outsource, whilst the foreign firm remains outsourced. When Φ<0, 
further trade liberalisation can result in a shift to the (O,V) equilibrium region. 
Proposition 3: At a given G>0: (i) Trade liberalisation can never lead to a switch towards (away 
from) vertical integration for the home (foreign) firm; (ii) In the neighbouring of a switch 
by one of the firms to vertical integration (outsourcing), there will a discrete increase (fall) 
in that firm’s output and in industry output, and a fall (increase) in the output of the rival 
firm.  
Proof: see Appendix C. 
 As discussed previously, asymmetric equilibria are more likely the more asymmetric the 
underlying marginal cost structures of the firms (i.e. the larger is Φ in absolute value). Thus, in 
the Figure 6, we see that (V,O) is the typical outcome when t is high and hence the foreign firm 
has a strong competitive disadvantage, but for low trade costs, (O,V) can emerge as the 
competitive advantage swings towards the foreign firm. Also note that the range of G over which 
multiple equilibria occurs is at its largest when Φ is zero.   
 Finally, we can now briefly explore the implications of the analysis for the effects of trade 
liberalisation on the consumer in the home country.  Trade liberalisation at a given regime raises 
output (see Proposition 2) and thus works to increase consumer surplus. This increase in 
consumer surplus is further enhanced when a threshold is crossed that leads the foreign firm to 
switch to vertical integration.  This is because when the foreign firm switches to vertical 
integration, both its own and the industry outputs experience a discrete upward jump. Trade 
liberalisation however leads to a discrete downward jump in consumer surplus when it results in 
the crossing of a threshold that brings about a switch to outsourcing by the home firm. This 
implies that, somewhat counter-intuitively, consumer surplus is not always maximised at free-
trade.  
                                                                                                                                                                                            
at low values of t (Φ<0) the foreign firm has a cost advantage. Other constellations of parameters values can be 
considered but this one is chosen because it captures all the interesting cases.   
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5.  SUMMARY OF THE RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper we have developed a model of endogenous outsourcing in an international oligopoly 
setting.  In line with some other recent theoretical contributions, we have modelled the 
outsourcing arrangement as one where a final good producer enters a bilateral relationship with 
an upstream supplier which undertakes a relationship-specific investment.   Earlier work that has 
adopted this approach has done so within a non-strategic monopolistically competitive market 
structure. We have demonstrated that the oligopolistic setup implies that additional strategic 
considerations may play a role in explaining the choice of mode of operation of firms.   In 
particular, we have shown that both strategic vertical integration and strategic outsourcing are 
possibilities in our model.   
 A vertically integrated firm incurs additional governance costs that can be avoided by 
sourcing components outside the firm.  If the outside supplier is not significantly more efficient at 
providing the intermediate to the required specifications, however, outsourcing will raise the final 
goods producer’s marginal production costs since the supplier fails to fully internalise the 
marginal benefit of investment.  Outsourcing then involves accepting higher marginal costs in 
exchange for a saving on fixed (governance) costs.   In a Cournot oligopoly setting, this gives rise 
to an additional strategic incentive to vertically integrate – as the lower marginal costs reduce the 
rival’s output and thus indirectly raises the integrated firm’s profits. 27  However, strategic 
outsourcing is also a possibility even when it results in higher marginal costs.  This is because 
when a firm chooses outsourcing, the rival firm’s incentive to invest strategically is reduced.  We 
have shown that when a firm has a sufficiently small market share under vertical integration, it 
has an incentive to strategically switch to outsourcing so as to increase its own and reduce its 
rival’s investment and output.  
 Unlike most contributions in the outsourcing literature (e.g. Grossman and Helpman, 
2002), this model gives rise to the possibility of ‘mixed outcomes’ in which, even when firms are 
ex-ante symmetric, they may choose different modes of operation in equilibrium; this is 
consistent with existing stylised facts whereby not all firms in the same industry and in all 
countries adopt the same mode of operation strategy.   
                                                           
27  Of course, if the outside supplier is much more efficient at providing the intermediate to the required 
specifications than the final goods producer, then outsourcing could lower both marginal and fixed costs. There 
would then be no trade-off between vertical integration and outsourcing as cost considerations would leave 
outsourcing as the dominant strategy. 
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 In our model, the choice of the mode of operation by firms is shown to depend on the 
combined effect of strategic considerations and the competitive pressure facing firms.  In general, 
we find that an increase in competitive pressure leads to a greater ‘demand’ for outsourcing.  
When a firm faces an exogenous increase in its marginal production costs or a fall in that of its 
rival, its share in total investment is lower and it has more to gain from inducing its rival to be 
less strategically aggressive in its choice of investment.  Thus, competitive pressure strengthens 
the strategic incentive for outsourcing. In addition to this effect, firms under intense competitive 
pressure are relatively less able to gain from taking on the fixed vertical integration costs in 
exchange for lower marginal production costs as these lower costs apply to a relatively smaller 
market share. Thus, competitive pressure weakens the strategic incentive to vertically integrate. 
Taken together, these two effects imply that an increase in competitive pressure will work in 
favour of outsourcing.  Although the ‘demand’ for outsourcing tends to increase in the extent of 
competitive pressure, the ‘supply’ of outsourcing will decrease; this is because the profitability of 
the intermediate goods producer decreases when the upstream firm requires fewer inputs and 
rents fall. Thus our model suggests that we can expect outsourcing to be more likely when firms 
face intermediate levels of competitive pressure.   
 Trade liberalisation directly impacts on the competitive pressure facing the firms – 
intensifying it for the home final goods firm and relaxing it for its foreign rival.  Thus, a fall in 
trade costs makes outsourcing more likely in the home country and it reduces the relative returns 
to outsourcing for the foreign firm.  This is because firms with a lower marginal cost are better 
able to reap the benefits of freer trade.    
 We also considered the implications of trade liberalisation and endogenous outsourcing for 
consumers. Since the higher marginal costs that outsourcing implies leads to higher final goods 
prices, the benefits of trade liberalisation for consumers are enhanced when it leads to less 
outsourcing.      
 The model developed in this paper allows for the endogenous emergence of different mode 
of operation equilibria and yields results that are not always obvious but contribute to explain 
stylised facts.  Whilst fairly simple, the basic framework developed in this paper is flexible 
enough to allow to be easily extended to consider different outsourcing scenarios (such as 
sourcing from abroad rather than domestically) and alternative assumptions concerning the 
trading setup.  Preliminary results on these extensions allow us to strongly conjecture that the 
main effects of competitive pressure on the outsourcing decision of firms are robust. 
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Appendix A – Proof of Proposition 1  
We will find it useful to rewrite the output response functions in compact form: 
ij
ij
ij b
yA
y
*
−+
=
δρ
 and *
**
*
ij
ij
ij b
yA
y
−−+
=
Φρδ
  (A1) 
where i=O,V is the mode of operation of the home firm and j=O,V is the mode of operation of 
the foreign firm. The parameter δ (δ * ) is an indicator variable that is unity if the home (foreign) 
firm outsources and zero if it is vertically integrated. 
 In this proposition we are concerned with the (V,O) and (V,V) equilibria.  Thus, 
importantly:  
3/4* == VVVV bb , 12/)17(
*β−=VOb and )}1(2/{)}1()7{( *2*** βββ +−−+=VOb .  A ranking of 
the ijb s and 
*
ijb s will prove useful and it is easy to verify that VVVOVO bbb ≥>
* .  The final 
inequality will be strict when: 1* <β .  
Proof of Proposition 1(i).  The home firm is vertically integrated. Its output when the foreign 
firm is also vertically integrated is
VV
VV
VV b
yAy
*
−
= .  A comparison of this with its output when the 
foreign firm chooses outsourcing, 
VO
VO
VO b
yAy
*
−
= , gives: ** VOVVVVVVVOVO yyybyb −=− . Now, 
since VVVO bb ≥ , we have that if VVVO yy ≥  then 
**
VOVV yy ≥ , and if 
**
VVVO yy ≥  then VOVV yy ≥ .  
Thus the firms’ outputs cannot both increase when the foreign firm outsources. 
Proof of Proposition 1(ii).  Solving the (V,V) subgame, we obtain the reduced form expression 
for foreign output when 0=Φ :  
1
*
+
=
VV
VV b
Ay  (note that VVVV bb =
* ). The corresponding 
expression when the foreign firm chooses to outsource (assuming that 0* == ρΦ ) is 
1
)1(
*
*
−
−
=
VOVO
VO
VO bb
bAy . This must be smaller than 
1+VOb
A  which in turn is at least as small as 
1
*
+
=
VV
VV b
Ay . Hence, at 0* == ρΦ  foreign output falls when the foreign firm outsources.  
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Proof of Proposition 1(iii).  The larger is *ρ , the more the foreign output response curve shifts 
outwards. It is obvious that if this shift is large enough then the foreign output rises. From part (i) 
of the proposition, this will lead to a fall in home output. 
Proof of Proposition 1(iv).  Solving the (V,V) subgame, we obtain the reduced form expression 
for foreign output: 
1)(
)1(
2
*
−
−−
=
VV
VVVV
VV b
bbAy Φ  . This falls in Φ and reaches zero at VVΦΦ
~
= , where 
A
b
b
VV
VV
VV
)1(~ −
=Φ . When this value of Φ is substituted into 
1
)1(
*
*
−
−−
=
VOVO
VOVO
VO bb
bbAy Φ , it is clear 
that this equation is still positive if VVVO bb >  (which is guaranteed when 1
* <β ).   This means 
that there are values of Φ  at which outsourcing raises foreign output (provided that 1* <β ). From 
part (i) of the proposition, this also implies that there are levels of Φ  at which the home output 
must definitely fall when the foreign firm chooses to outsource. 
 
Appendix B – Proof of Proposition 2 
We will use the same notation as in Appendix A. 
 Totally differentiating the equations in (A1) we get:  
 
ij
ij
ij b
dy
dy
*
−
=  and *
* )(
ij
ij
ij b
dydt
dy
+
−=  where we hold constant *,, ρρA and the components of 
Φ other than t.   Solving for the effect of trade costs on outputs, we get:  
0
1
1
* >
−
=
ijij
ij
bbdt
dy
, 0
1*
*
<
−
−
=
ijij
ijij
bb
b
dt
dy
and 0
1
1
* >
−
−
=
ijij
ijij
bb
b
dt
dp
. From the first-order conditions 
for k we obtain expressions that take the form: ijijij yk κ=  and
***
ijijij yk κ= , where ijκ and 
*
ijκ are 
positive parameters. It is thus easy to see that home investment (K=k 2 ) falls and foreign 
investment rises (K * =k *2 ) when t falls. Hence, as stated in part (i) of the proposition, trade 
liberalisation (a fall in t) reduces home output and investment, increases foreign output and 
investment and reduces the market price.  
 Given that the intermediate prices are also linear in the corresponding downstream outputs, 
as stated in part (ii) of the proposition, under outsourcing trade liberalisation raises the foreign 
and lowers the home intermediate price.   
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Appendix C – Proof of Proposition 3 
As a first step to proving this proposition, we first need to show that the foreign indifference loci 
fall in t and the corresponding home loci are increasing in t. Define the threshold level of 
governance costs at which the home (foreign) firm is indifferent between vertical integration and 
outsourcing given that the other firm chooses VOj ,= as jG
~  ( *~ jG ).  A home indifference locus 
can be written as 22~ OjVjVjj yyG −= λ , where 10 << Vjλ  and a foreign indifference locus can be 
written as 2*2***~ jOjVjVj yyG −= λ , where 10 * << jVλ .  The parameters 95
*
== VVVV λλ , while 
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −−
+=
144
1415
9
5 2** ββλVO and ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −−
+=
144
1415
9
5 2* ββλOV .    
 As we are concerned with situations in which G>0, the relevant section to consider for 
these loci is where they are positive.   
 For the home firm’s loci to slope up, i.e. 0
~
>
dt
Gd j , we need: 
02 >⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡
−
dt
dy
y
dt
dy
y OjOj
Vj
VjVjλ .  (A2) 
Since we are only concerned with 0~ >jG , we know that 
22 )()( OjVjVj yy ≥λ and hence: 
OjVjVj yy ≥λ .  (A3) 
In all cases, it can also be shown that
dt
dy
dt
dy OjVj
Vj >λ . When this is combined with (A3), we get 
(A2) and hence the loci slope up.  
 For the foreign firm’s loci to slope down, i.e. 0
~*
<
dt
Gd j , we need: 
02
*
*
*
** <⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡
−
dt
dy
y
dt
dy
y jOjO
jV
jVjVλ . (A4) 
 
It follows from  2*2** jOjVjV yy ≥λ  that: 
***
jOjVjV yy ≥λ  (A5) 
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In each case it can be shown that
dt
dy jV
jV
*
*λ  is more negative than
dt
dy jO
*
. When this is combined 
with (A5), we get (A4), which implies that the loci are downward sloping.  
Proof of Proposition 3(i).  The proof follows directly from the slope of the loci. When its rival 
chooses mode of operation j, then above jG
~ ( *~ jG ) the home (foreign) firm chooses to outsource 
and below the locus it chooses to vertically integrate.  *~ jG  is monotonically decreasing in t.  Thus, 
at a given G, a fall in t that results in a crossing of this threshold will move us to a point below 
*~
jG ; hence, if the home firm is choosing mode of operation  j, a fall in t will result in a switch to 
vertical integration by the foreign firm.  Similarly, given that jG
~  is monotonically increasing in t, 
at a given G, a fall in t that results in a crossing of this threshold will move us to a point above 
jG
~  and, if the foreign firm is choosing mode of operation  j, result in a switch to outsourcing by 
the home firm. Hence, a fall in t cannot lead to a switch towards (away from) vertical integration 
for the home (foreign) firm.  
Proof of Proposition 3(ii).  When trade liberalisation, or any other change, results in a switch in 
the mode of operation of one of the firms, it leads to a discrete change in outputs.  For instance, 
since 0~ 22 ≥−= OjVjVjj yyG λ  (where 10 << Vjλ ), it must be the case that OjVj yy > .  Similarly, it can 
be shown that ** jOjV yy >  at 
*~
jG .  Total industry output moves in the same direction as that of the 
firm that changes its mode of operation. To see this, consider what happens to total output when 
the home firm changes its mode of operation. When home chooses mode of operation i=O,V, the 
response of the foreign firm, given in (A1), can be written in more compact notation as 
*
*
*
ij
ijj
ij b
y
y
−
=
α
, where Φρδα −+= *** Aj  and *δ  is an indicator variable that is unity if the firm 
outsources and zero if it is vertically integrated.  From (A1), *jα  does not depend on the home 
firm’s mode of operation but only on that of the foreign firm.  Total output when home is 
vertically integrated and foreign chooses j=O,V  then depends on the output of the home firm as 
follows: 
*
**
* )1(
Vj
VjVjj
VjVjVj b
yb
yyY
−+
=+=
α
     (A6) 
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Similarly total output when home outsources and foreign chooses j=O,V then is  
*
**
* )1(
Oj
OjOjj
OjOjOj b
yb
yyY
−+
=+=
α
 (A7)  
Thus: 
OjOjVjVjOjOjVjVj ybybYbYb )1()1(
****
−−−=−  (A8) 
If the RHS of (A8) is positive then, since ** OjVj bb ≤ , we must have OjVj YY > .  We must therefore 
check that the RHS of (A8) is positive. This will be true if 
Oj
Vj
y
y
 is larger than 
)1(
)1(
*
*
−
−
Vj
Oj
b
b
.   We 
know that 
Oj
Vj
y
y
 must be at least as large as
Vjλ
1 . Hence, a sufficient condition for OjVj YY >  is that 
Vjλ
1 is larger than 
)1(
)1(
*
*
−
−
Vj
Oj
b
b
.  
 First, consider the case in which the foreign firm is vertically integrated. Then, 
5
91
=
VVλ
, 3/4* =VVb and 12/)17(
* β−=VVb . Using this, it is easy to check that 
VVλ
1 is greater 
than 
)1(
)1(
*
*
−
−
VV
OV
b
b and so OVVV YY > . 
 Next, consider the case in which the foreign firm is outsourcing. Then, we must make use 
of 
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −−
+
=
144
1415
9
5
11
2** ββλVO
 ,    
)1(2
6
*
2**
*
β
ββ
+
++
=VOb and 
)1(2
)1(6
*
2**
*
β
νβββ
+
−+++
=OOb  where **
2*
15
1
ββββ
β
ν
−++
−
= .  It is straightforward to verify that: 
VOλ
1 >
)1(
)1(
*
*
−
−
VO
OO
b
b and so that OOVO YY > . 
 Analogous calculations can be used to show that when the foreign firm changes its mode of 
operation to vertical integration, this results in a discrete increase in its own and in industry 
output. 
 
 29
References 
Abraham, K. and S. Taylor (1996).  “Firms’ Use of Outside Contractors: Theory and Evidence”, 
Journal of Labor Economics, 14, 394-424.    
Antràs, P. and  E. Helpman (2004). “Global Sourcing”, Journal of Political Economy, 112, 552-
580.  
Audet, D. (1996).  “Globalization in the Clothing Industry”, in Globalization of Industry: 
Overview and Sector Reports, Paris: OECD. 
Bartel, A., S. Lach and N Sicherman (2005). “Outsourcing and Technological Change”,  NBER 
Working Paper No 11158.  
Bhagwati, J. A. Panagariya and T.N Srinivasan (2005). “The Muddles over Outsourcing”, 
Journal of Economic Perspectives, 18, 93-114. 
Campa, J. and L. Goldberg (1997).  “The Evolving External Orientation of Manufacturing 
Industries: Evidence from Four Countries”, Federal Reserve Bank of New York Economic 
Policy Review, 4, 79-99.  
Chen Y., J. Ishikawa and Z. Yu (2004). “Trade Liberalisation and Strategic Outsourcing”,   
Journal of International Economics, 63, 419-436. 
Coase, R. (1937). “The Nature of the Firm”, Economica, 4, 386-405  
Feenstra, R. (1998).  “Integration of Trade and Disintegration of Production in the Global 
Economy”, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 12, 31-50.   
Görg, H. and A. Hanley (2004). “Does Outsourcing Increase Profitability?”, The Economic and 
Social Review, 35, 267-288. 
Görzig, B. and A. Stephan (2002). “Outsourcing and Firm-Level Performance”, DP No. 309, 
DIW Berlin. 
Grossman S. and O. Hart (1986). “The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical 
and Lateral Integration”, Journal of Political Economy, 94, 691-719.  
Grossman, G. and E. Helpman (2002).  “Integration versus Outsourcing in Industry Equilibrium”, 
Quarterly Journal of Economics,  117, 85-120. 
Grossman, G. and E. Helpman (2003).  “Outsourcing versus FDI in Industry Equilibrium” 
Journal of the European Economic Association, 1, 317-327. 
Grossman, G, and E. Helpman (2005). “Outsourcing in a Global Economy”, Review of Economic 
Studies, 72, 135 –159. 
Hart, O. and  J. Moore (1990), “Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm”, Journal of Political 
Economy, 98, 1119-1158.  
Helpman, E. (2006). “Trade, FDI, and the Organization of Firms”, NBER Working Paper No. 
12091 
Hummels, D., J. Ishi and K.-M. Yi (2001).  “The Nature and Growth of Vertical Specialization in 
World Trade”, Journal of International Economics, 54, 75-96.   
Kimura, F. (2002). “Subcontracting and Performance of Small and Medium Firms in Japan”, 
Small Business Economics, 18, 163-175. 
McLaren, J. (1999). “Supplier Relations and the Market Context: A Theory of Handshakes”, 
Journal of International Economics, 48, 121-138. 
McLaren, J. (2000). “Globalization and Vertical Structure”, American Economic Review, XC, 
1239-1254. 
Nickerson J.A. and R. Vanden Bergh (1999). “Economizing in a Context of Strategizing: 
Governance Mode Choice in Cournot Competition”, Journal of Economic Behavior and 
Organization, 40, 1-15. 
 30
Shy, O and R. Stenbacka (2003). “Strategic Outsourcing”, Journal of Economic Behavior & 
Organization, 50, 203-224.  
Software Development Magazine (2004). 
Spencer, B. (2005). “International Outsourcing and Incomplete Contracts”, Canadian Journal of 
Economics 38, 1107-1135. 
Spencer, B. and L. Qui (2001) “Keiretsu and Relationship-Specific Investments: Barriers to 
Trade?” International Economic Review,  42, 871-901. 
Williamson, O.E. (1975). Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust Implications. NY: 
Free Press. 
Williamson, O.E. (1985). The Economic Institutions of Capitalism. NY: Free Press. 
 
 
 
 31
 
 
Figure 1.  Output response functions (Φ=0) 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.  Output response functions (Φ is large and *ρ =0) 
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Figure 3. Foreign firm’s profit indifference locus when the home firm vertically integrates 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Both firms choose their mode of operation (in the figure G=G* and * 0ρ = )  
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Figure 5. Both firms chose their mode of operation: regime demarcation lines 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6. Both firms chose their mode of operation: the effects of trade liberalisation 
 
Φ
G 
(V,O) and  (O,V) 
(O,O) 
(V,O) 
(V,V) 
(O,O) 
(V,O) 
(V,V) 
(V,O) and  (O,V) 
(O,V) 
(V,V) 
(O,O) 
t Φ=0 t=0 
G 
